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LIMITS TO GROWTH REVISITED: HAS THE WORLD 
MODELING DEBATE MADE ANY PROGRESS? 
Walter E. Hecox* 
LIMITS To GROWTH, lone of the most controversial academic stud-
ies of this century, was introduced to the world on March 2, 1972, 
at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C. Written by 
Dennis Meadows and others at the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology, this study was released amid great publicity and interest. 
The immediate reaction came primarily in the popular press, which 
focused on the book's dire predictions of future world collapse. The 
media speculated that this study might change the course of man-
kind, was an international event, contained chilling statistics to 
underscore man's predicament, was a pioneering effort towards pla-
netary planning, raised life-and-death questions, and should stir the 
imagination of thoughtful men and women everywhere. 
Severe criticism was also immediately leveled at every aspect of 
the study. Some of this criticism was reported in the popular press, 
but the majority of adverse reaction came more slowly in the aca-
demic journals and specialized publications. The criticism was in-
tense and broad-ranging. The study was claimed to be a piece of 
irresponsible nonsense, wolf crying; over-simplified and confusing, 
a doomsday prophesy, and a publicity stunt. Serious doubts were 
expressed about the validity of its assumptions. The methodology 
of the model was also felt to be uncomfortably similar to the au-
thors' subjective preconceptions. 
At present the LIMITS debate continues to simmer at a less visable 
level as opposing sides dig in for a prolonged fight. The depth of 
feeling remains intense but the arena has shifted from the popular 
press to scientific meetings, journals, and counter-modeling efforts. 
'Assistant Professor of Economics at Colorado College in Colorado Springs. The author is 
grateful for financial support from the Colorado College Chapman Fund for Research in 
Business and Economics. 
I D.H. MEADOWS, et aI., LIMITS To GROWTH (1972) [hereinafter cited as LIMITS]. 
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While this departure from the public spotlight is inevitable, it is 
perhaps unfortunate since the debate raised by the study and its 
outcome may be crucial to predicting and controlling the world's 
future. Further, without a broad public grasp of the conclusions to 
this debate, there will be little hope that social and political policies 
designed to avoid possible adverse consequences can be instituted 
or sustained in any peaceful or democratic manner. Some commen-
tators doubt the feasibility of this latter climate for change, regard-
less of the public's grasp of the situation.2 It is certain, however, that 
unless people can comprehend the consequences of their actions, 
voluntary changes in behavior or attitudes will be impossible. 
In the spirit of broadening the range of participants in the con-
tinuing debate over prospects for the world's future, this article 
provides a survey of recent world models and evaluates them. The 
critical responses to these models trace a dialog of immense import-
ance to the way in which global problems will be dealt with in the 
future. The modeling tools being researched and debated today will 
surely become important forms of analysis for policy makers within 
the next decade. In turn, the accuracy of the assumptions upon 
which these modeling tools are based and the success with which 
they are applied will significantly affect the direction of world 
events. 
I. ORIGINS OF THE GLOBAL MODELS 
The existence of the world models which form the basis of the 
LIMITS To GROWTH controversy was dependent upon two separate 
but parallel developments. First, a method of modeling complex 
systems, system dynamics, had to be developed and the large com-
puters capable of running such massive models had to be perfected. 
Second, support for the application of such tools to world problems 
had to mature. These two developments merged on June 29-30, 
1970, when Professor Jay W. Forrester of the Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology was invited to address a meeting of the Club of 
Rome in Bern, Switzerland. From this meeting emerged a series of 
world models. In order to better understand these models, it isnec-
essary to look briefly at the background both of Forrester's system 
dynamics and of the Club of Rome. Following this examination, the 
events leading up to and surrounding the public presentation of the 
LIMITS To GROWTH results in March, 1972, will be described. 
2 See generally R.L. HEILBRONER, AN INQUIRY INTO THE HUMAN PROSPECf (1974) and R. 
VACCA, THE COMING DARK AGE (1974). 
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A. System Dynamics 
Computer models attempt to make explicit the myriad of rela-
tionships affecting a designated system or set of interrelated forces. 
In a sense, they attempt to imitate mental models of such systems. 
Computer models, however, unlike mental models, can explicitly 
and sequentially show dynamic consequences as components of the 
system interact. This capability makes possible analysis of the in-
teractions in a manner which would be difficult, if not impossible, 
with mental models. Jay W. Forrester pioneered the application of 
the digital computer, tactical military decision-making, and 
information-feedback systems to the interacting forces of social sys-
tems. His experience in the late 1940's and early 1950's designing 
air defense systems and guiding the production of their needed com-
ponents led to an approach to management problems which differed 
considerably from previous attempts. Starting at M.LT. in 1956, he 
refined this analysis of industrial problems, resulting in the first 
publications on industrial dynamics as a management technique 
later in the decade3 and the appearance of his book, INDUSTRIAL 
DYNAMICS, in 1961.4 
The approach to modeling an industry is similar to that dealing 
with other complex systems under the system dynamics 
methodology. Basically, it is necessary to build models by precisely 
describing the system organization, its internal relations, and as-
sumptions about external contacts across the system boundary. 
This approach depicts the effect of various influences on the growth 
and change of the system. It is possible, as a next step, to change 
components or relationships in order to simulate alternative out-
comes. Such gaming becomes valuable because, while managers can 
describe their organization and its relationships, they cannot intui-
tively grasp the dynamic behavior of the organization. Thus, ac-
cording to system dynamics, mental models are inferior to computer 
models because only computer models enable interrelationships and 
their consequences to be made explicit. While this technique is only 
as good as the soundness of the relationships built into the model, 
it has proven valuable to management science in many cases.s 
3 See Forrester, Industrial Dynamics-A Major Breakthrough for Decision Makers, 36 
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW 37-66 (1958); Forrester, Advertising: A Problem in Industrial 
Dynamics, 37 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW 100-10 (1959). 
• J.W. FORRESTER, INDUSTRIAL DYNAMICS (1961). The technique of system dynamics is 
covered in: J.W. FORRESTER, PRINCIPLES OF SYSTEMS: TEXT AND WORKBOOK (1968) and ex-
tended by M.R. GOODMAN, STUDY NOTES IN SYSTEM DYNAMICS (1974). 
, For applications and critical review of system dynamics as applied to industry, see Ansoff 
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After applying system dynamics to industrial cases, Forrester 
began modeling urban areas. It was found again that managers 
could describe their systems but not predict behavior. Not only were 
systems counter-intuitive,6 but also nearly every measure in urban 
areas which alleviated a problem in the short-run was found to be 
detrimental in the long-run. The results of this extension of systems 
modeling were published in 1969 as URBAN DYNAMICS, 7 providing a 
computer model of the major internal forces affecting the balance 
of urban population, housing, and industry. The work in urban 
dynamics was extended in later years as applications and criticisms 
took place.R 
Forrester's system dynamics thus had nearly fifteen years of de-
velopment behind it at the time that the Club of Rome became 
interested in it.9 While this technique has been severely criticized, III 
particularly because many relationships in previous applications 
were put into equations without the benefit of sufficient empirical 
data, it is presumably capable of intuitively sorting out complex 
interactions and simulating their possible outcomes. Club of Rome 
members wanted to apply this type of activity to a situation which 
they termed The Predicament of Mankind. 
B. Club of Rome 
One man was essentially responsible for the existence of the 
LIMITS To GROWTH study. Utilizing perseverence, patience, and con-
siderable financial backing, Dr. Aurelio Peccei pursued activities 
and studies leading to LIMITS To GROWTH. Dr. Peccei's efforts took 
concrete shape as the Club of Rome, an organization which in turn 
and Slevin, An Appreciation of Industrial Dynamics, 14 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 383-97 (1968); 
Forrester. Industrial Dynamics: After the First Decade, 14 MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 398-415 
(1968); D.L. MEADOWS, DYNAMICS OF COMMODITY PRODUCTION CYCLES (1970); H.S.D. COLE, et 
al., MODELS OF DOOM (1973) [hereinafter cites as DOOM]; Coyle, On the Scope and Purpose 
of Industrial Dynamics, 4 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SYSTEMS SCIENCE 397-406 (1973); Coyle, 
System Dynamics: An Approach to Policy Formulation, 73 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS POLICY 40-
48 (1973). 
• Forrester, Counterintuitive Behavior of Social Systems, 73 TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 1-14 
(1971). 
7 J.W. FORRESTER, URBAN DYNAMICS (1969). 
• For critical reviews of urban applications of system dynamics, see READINGS IN URBAN 
DYNAMICS: VOLUME I (N.J. Mass ed. 1974). 
• For an overview of Forrester's work on system dynamics applied to industrial and urban 
problems, see COLLECTED PAPERS OF JAY W. FORRESTER (J.W. Forrester ed. 1974). 
\0 A flavor of the criticism engendered by system dynamics applications is shown by 
Schwartz and Foin, A Critical Review of the Social Systems Models of Jay Forrester, 1 HUMAN 
ECOLOGY 1-13 (1972). 
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provided the incentive and financial backing for a world model to 
explore critical problems and to suggest solutions. Controversial and 
energetic, Peccei convinced others that his concern about the 
world's future should be converted into concrete action aimed at 
finding solutions. 11 
In the mid-1960's, Peccei first began to realize that world prob-
lems were embodied in a set of interconnected relationships and 
could only be comprehended through an overview that explicitly 
provided the links between seemingly unrelated occurrences and 
conditions. He viewed the world as basically mismanaged. Accus-
tomed to rational management of comprehensible business and en-
gineering systems by technicians and experts, Peccei set out to pur-
sue a similar approach to and solution for world problems. In THE 
CHASM AHEAD,12 Peccei described his erratic support of a study to 
explore possible solutions. 
During 1968 he joined with other individuals who shared his 
opinion about the state of world problems to form the Club of Rome 
in order to pursue, in a more organized manner, solutions to these 
pressing phenomena. By 1970 the Club had grown to 75 members 
of 25 nationalities. The image of a project concerning The Predica-
ment of Mankind gradually took shape and encompassed many of 
the ideas first expressed in THE CHASM AHEAD. 13 
C. Birth of a World Model 
Jay W. Forrester presented one possible methodology, system 
dynamics, for studying The Predicament of Mankind and possible 
transitions to global equilibrium at the June 29, 1970, meeting ofthe 
Club in Bern, Switzerland. Forrester felt that system dynamios 
could". . . deal with the broad sweep of human affairs and the way 
in which major elements of the world ecology interact with each 
other."14 One result of this meeting was Forrester's invitation for 
" For background information on Peccei, see Northrup, Club of Rome Merges World's 
Woes Into One - And Tries to Solve It, Wall Street Journal, October 2, 1972, reprinted as 
Northrup, Club of Rome - 75 Powerful Men Who Want to Save the World, 73 SCIENCE DIGEST 
22-25 (March 1973); Simmons, System Dynamics and Technocracy, in DOOM, supra note 5, 
at 205-06; A. PECCEI, THE CHASM AHEAD (1969) [hereinafter cited as CHASM); The Club of 
Rome's Co-founder, 72 NEW SCIENTIST 604 (March 16, 1972). 
12 CHASM, supra note 11. 
,:I For more information on the Club of Rome, see Peccei, The Predicament of Mankind, 
70 SUCCESSO 149 (June 1970); Peccei, Where Are We? Where Are We Going? 70 SUCCESSO 119-
26 (February 1970); Kind, The Totality of the World Problematique Must Now Be Addressed, 
5 CENTER REPORT 29 (October 1972); Club of Rome: A Worldwide Organization, New York 
Times, March 1, 1972, at 38, col. 3. 
It J.W. FORRESTER, WORLD DYNAMICS (1972) [hereinafter cited as WORLD DYNAMICS). 
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Club members to visit M.LT. to determine "firsthand" if system 
dynamics methods were suitable for pursuing the "project." 
Forrester perfected his beginnings of a "world model" (World: 1) 
into a dynamic set of interactions expressed in system dynamics 
format early in July, 1970. On July 20, 1970, the Club convened in 
Cambridge, Massachusetts for ten days of study, presentations, and 
discussion concerning World: 1. As a result of the Cambridge meet-
ing, the Executive Committee of the Club established a one-year 
$250,000 research program at M.I.T. with funding by the Volkswa-
gen Foundation in Germany. This initial study, Phase One of the 
Project on the Predicament of Mankind (Phase One) was conducted 
by an international team under the direction of Professor Dennis 
Meadows, a colleague of Forrester's at M.I.T. 
Forrester did not participate directly in Phase One, but did pur-
sue the world model which he had prepared for the July, 1970, 
meeting. He quickly expanded the computer model used at the July, 
1970 meeting into a manuscript describing his world system 
dynamics model in full detail and discussing possible future out-
come of policy alternatives. This formulation came to be known as 
the World:2 model. 
World:2 sketched a world system with five variables: world popu-
lation, natural resources, industrial capital, agricultural capital, 
and pollution. Each of these variables, except natural resources, has 
both an inflow and an outflow affecting the amount {level) of the 
variable, such as births and deaths for population level or invest-
ment and deterioration for capital. Only natural resources lack an 
inflow because of the posited irreplaceable nature of resource stocks. 
These flows affect the levels of variables and are related to each 
other and to the levels of variables by equations describing, empiri-
cally and intuitively, the interrelationships. The intuitive relation-
ships especially, but also the empirical relationships, are tested for 
viability by running the model from 1900 to 1970 to ensure that they 
follow historical patterns. Then various policies can be simulated so 
that their likely results in the future, up to the year 2100, can be 
determined. 
Forrester was careful to qualify his goals in developing World:2 
and in communicating World:2 via his book, WORLD DYNAMICS. He 
looked only at broad aspects of the world system and did not address 
the difficulties of implementing changes needed to alter the course 
of human events. He did not allow for the changes in human aspira-
tions and values that could accrue from widespread recognition of 
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the predicament facing mankind. 15 Rather, he placed his own con-
fidence in this simplistic sketch of the world's dynamic behavior as 
a source of recommendations for action and challenged others to 
counter his image of the world's future with explicit responses. 16 
Despite Forrester's qualifications and limitations on the relation-
ship of his model to the real world, he came under immediate attack 
for nearly every aspect of WORLD DYNAMICS. However, this criticism 
appeared primarily in the scientific journals. If the public was aware 
of the study at all, it was aware only to the extent of a vague impres-
sion that a computer model had found disquieting evidence about 
future world conditions. This low-level public exposure would not 
be repeated in the next round of global modeling. 
The Club of Rome's Phase One study started in the fall of 1970 
and was completed in eighteen months. Forrester's World:2 model 
gave the international team of seventeen a running start for their 
work. Basically, the WORLD DYNAMICS model was extended and dis-
aggregated into separate sectors by the Meadows' group, thereafter 
becoming known as the World:3 model. By the summer of 1971, the 
work at M.I.T. was progressing well. At the time WORLD DYNAMICS 
was published, Dennis Meadows was ready to discuss the prelimi-
nary findings of Phase One. In the process of revising the original 
Forrester model and verifying its conclusions, the M.I.T. group gen-
erated a series of "working papers."17 None of the alterations made 
by the group had resulted in ". . . any major differences to the crisis 
forecasts or the crisis measures needed to avoid them."18 Thus, the 
M.LT. group could join the Club of Rome as early as the summer 
of 1971 in " ... urgently contacting decision-makers up to the head 
of state level to warn them where their present policies might be 
leading."19 
15 [d., at ix. 
" In Forrester's words: 
[d. 
Having defined with care the model contained herein, and having examined its dynamic 
behavior and implications, I have greater confidence in this world system model than in 
others that I now have available. Therefore, this is the model I should use for recommend-
ing actions. . . . It is to be hoped that those who believe they already have some different 
model that is more valid will present it in the same explicit detail, so that its assumptions 
and consequences can be examined and compared .... 
17 The major papers were listed in an "Appendix-Related Studies," LIMITS, supra note 1, 
at 198-200. These papers were published in TOWARD GWBAL EQUILIBRIUM: COLLECTED PAPERS 
(D.L. Meadows & D.H. Meadows eds. 1973). 
" Leach, Computer Warns of World Pollution Fight Errors, Denver Post, July 19, 1971, at 
18. See also Meadows, Predicament of Mankind, 71 FUTURIST (August 1971), reprinted in: 133 
CURRENT 3-9 (October 1971). 
" Leach, Computer Warns of Pollution Fight Errors, supra note 18. 
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A preliminary draft report on the results of the M.LT. group's 
efforts, based largely on the "working papers," and entitled LIMITS 
To GROWTH (LIMITS) was scheduled for publication in March, 1972.20 
Various members of the Club of Rome did not wait until publica-
tion to talk about the book's results. Thus, the press picked up 
hints that a major computer study of global trends predicted dire 
consequences for mankind unless radical changes were instituted. 21 
The apparent importance of the study's findings was enhanced by 
indications that LIMITS To GROWTH was being "polished and re-
fined" by Potomac Associates, a newly formed research organiza-
tion, and would be translated into a dozen languages by the Club 
of Rome and placed in the "right" hands so that its message could 
influence policy and stir public debateY 
In preparation for release of the book, Potomac Associates hired 
a public relations firm which prepared appropriate press releases 
and background materials. The public relations campaign culmi-
nated on February 27, 1972, and resulted in widespread newspaper 
coverage.23 As an appropriate "birth" for LIMITS To GROWTH, Poto-
mac Associates had been able to arrange for the Woodrow Wilson 
International Center For Scholars at the Smithsonian Institution in 
Washington to hold a "Symposium" on March 2, 1972, financed by 
the Xerox Corporation. This invitation-only affair was blown into a 
major event by the publicity and the desire of distinguished individ-
uals of all professions to attend. By March 2, when copies of LIMITS 
reached the bookstands, the publicity efforts of Potomac Associates, 
the Club of Rome, and the M.LT. group had turned the presenta-
tion into a major production for the 250 guests and assorted media. 24 
The Club's major program of translation and distribution further 
guaranteed wide attention. 
211 The preliminary draft report on Phase One was written by Dennis Meadows' wife Do-
nella, also a member of the study team at M.LT. It was circulated to a number of people 
during the fall of 1971, with a copy reaching a newly formed "non-partisan research and 
analysis organization" called Potomac Associates. The rights to publication of a Phase One 
report for "general readership" were signed over to this group late in 1971. Subsequently, 
Potomac Associates hired an editor and illustrator to rework Donella Meadows' draft report. 
Gillette, The Limits to Growth: Hard Sell for a Computer View of Doomsday, 175 SCIENCE 
1089 (March 10, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Hard Sell]. 
21 The Worst Is Yet To Be? TIME, January 24, 1972, at 32; Lewis, To Grow and To Die, 
New York Times, January 29, 1972 at 29, col. 1; Lewis, To Grow and To Die: II, New York 
Times, January 31, 1972 at 41, col. 1. 
22 The Worst Is Yet To Be?, supra note 21. 
.. Reinhold, Mankind Warned of Perils in Growth, New York Times, February 27, 1972 at 
1, col. 5. 
" Hard Sell, supra note 20, at 1088-92. 
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At the Symposium, Meadows described the major findings of 
LIMITS, followed by some general discussion which can be seen in 
retrospect as the opening salvo of intense criticism of the study and 
its findings and recommendations. 25 The contrast between the pub-
lic debut of LIMITS and of WORLD DYNAMICS was striking. The pitch 
of LIMITS at general readership and the blitz of publicity made it an 
international event whereas WORLD DYNAMICS reached few ears, 
even though its essential structure and conclusions were exactly the 
same as those of LIMITS. 
II. THE LIMITS MODEL AND ITS PREDICTIONS 
Both supporters and critics of the analysis contained in LIMITS To 
GROWTH agree that such analysis represented one of the most ambi-
tious attempts to date to bring together the interaction of five global 
variables (population growth, non-renewable resource depletion, 
food supply, capital investment, and pollution) into one general 
model of the future of the world.26 The ambitiousness of LIMITS was 
pointed out by its authors: 
The model we have constructed is, like every other model, imperfect, 
over-simplified, and unfinished. We are well aware of its shortcomings, 
but we believe that it is the most useful model now available for dealing 
with problems far out on the space-time graph. To our knowledge it is 
the only formal model in existence that is truly global in scope, that has 
a time horizon longer than thirty years, and that includes important 
variables such as population, food production, and pollution, not as 
independent entities, but as dynamically interacting elements, as they 
are in the real worldY 
Many could not comprehend the purpose of the authors as to timing 
and format of the report. This confusion or disagreement interfered 
with the message which the authors desired to convey. 
For example, their choice of early publication of results became 
one area of bitter dispute over LIMITS.28 A basic belief of the system 
dynamics school is that decisions are constantly being made on 
important matters affecting the future, with only the help of mental 
" Reinhold, Warning on Growth Perils Is Examined at Symposium, New York Times, 
March 3, 1972 at 41, col. 6. 
" Even one of the severest critics admits that" ... it is one of the most original and 
ambitious constructions in the history of social science." Freeman, Malthus With a 
Computer, DOOM, supra note 5, at 10. 
27 LIMITS, supra note 1, at 21·22. 
" For example, see Another Whiff of Doomsday, 236 NATURE 47-49 (March 10, 1972); 
Limits to Misconception, THE ECONOMIST, March 11, 1972, at 20-22. 
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models. More precision and intuition can be reached with the help 
of explicit mathematical models, such as World:3. A belief in the 
representativeness of World:3 as a functional model of the world 
meant that it had reached a stage of usefulness in the authors' eyes: 
". . . the basic behavior modes we have already observed in this 
model appear to be so fundamental and general that we do not 
expect our broad conclusions to be substantially altered by further 
revisions. "29 
Even if the authors firmly believed in the usefulness of World:3 
as a guide to policy makers, their choice of the LIMITS To GROWTH 
format remained a puzzle to many readers. The authors and their 
supporters believed that a non-technical summary of the meaning 
and consequences of World:3 was too important and urgent to be 
left only within technical, scientific circles. They believed that 
LIMITS' meaning and message should quickly be brought to a wider 
public.30 It was decided that the complete, scientific description of 
all the data and mathematical equations included in World:3 would 
not be published until release of the final technical report,31 al-
though a few groups of critics were given access to drafts of the 
technical report earlier.32 This unorthodox approach to publication 
of a scientific study diluted the impact of the study's findings in 
some scientific circles.33 
A. An Explicit Description of Man's Predicament 
The Predicament of Mankind, which had been the subject matter 
of the M.LT. Phase One study, could now be expressed in more 
concrete terms. One conclusion reached by the group was expressed 
in the Introduction of LIMITS thusly: 
If th'e present growth trends in world population, industrialization, pol-
lution, food production, and resource depletion continue unchanged, the 
limits to growth on this planet will be reached sometime within the next 
one hundred years. The most probable result will be a rather sudden and 
uncontrollable decline in both population and industrial capacity.3~ 
,. LIMITS, supra note 1, at 22. 
311 [d. at 23. 
31 Despite promises that the technical report would "shortly" be available to the general 
public, it took over two and one-half years before it was released. DYNAMICS OF GROWTH IN A 
FINITE WORLD (D.L. Meadows & D.H. Meadows eds. 1974). 
32 Only by making preliminary copies available to a few groups of critics was it possible to 
have timely rebuttal of LIMITS. A prime example of such dialogue was DOOM, supra note 5. 
33 See infra note 58. 
:u LIMITS, supra note 1, at 23. 
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These growth trends, as well as the limits to their continuation, were 
summarized as "The Limits To Exponential Growth."3" 
The "most probable" scenario of rather abrupt and uncontrolled 
decreases in population and output was highlighted by a "World 
Model Standard Run,"36 which simulated conditions to the year 
2100, assuming the occurrence of " ... no major change in the 
physical, economic, or social relationships that have historically 
governed the development of the world system."37 In this computer 
run, the five basic variables followed historical values from 1900 to 
1970. After 1970, food, industrial output, and population grow expo-
nentially until a rapidly diminishing resource base slows down in-
dustrial growth. Natural delays cause population and pollution to 
continue growing beyond the peak of industrialization. Population 
is finally halted by decreasing food and medical services which 
jointly boost the death rate. 38 This behavior mode is overshoot and 
collapse, with the consequence that growth is stopped well before 
the year 2100. 
Perhaps even more discouraging, the authors found that not even 
the "most optimistic" estimates of the benefits of technology could 
postpone the collapse beyond the year 2100 A.D. This conclusion 
was reached by a series of modified runs of the world model to test 
the impact of alternative assumptions about the behavior of varia-
bles. In each case exponential growth of population and capital 
occurred, followed by collapse.39 The authors concluded that: 
. . . technological optimism is the most common and the most danger-
ous reaction to our findings from the world model. Technology can re-
lieve the symptoms of a problem without affecting the underlying 
causes. Faith in technology as the ultimate solution to all problems can 
thus divert our attention from the most fundamental problem-the 
problem of growth in a finite system-and prevent us from taking effec-
tive action to solve it.40 
This was not a blanket rejection of technology, but rather a call for 
its selective adaptation within a world determined to provide delib-
erate checks on further growth. 
:m [d. at 45-87. 
:~ [d. at 124-25. 
'" [d. at 124. 
:IK [d. 
". See "Chapter IV - Technology and the Limits to Growth," id. at 129-55. 
III [d. at 154. 
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B. Interaction Among the Five Global Variables 
LIMITS provides a summary amount of detail on each of the five 
variables and their interactions within the global system. Popula-
tion is currently rising exponentially and will double in thirty-two 
years, with successive doubling predicted at an even more rapid 
rateY Land is an essential input to food and, despite a doubling or 
even quadrupling of food output per acre, a food shortage will be 
inevitable. 42 Other necessary prerequisites to continued growth will 
also become scarce. Minerals and fossil fuels have limited, even if 
presently unknown, reserves, and they will become progressively 
more expensive and scarce in spite of technological advancements 
and discoveries. 43 The existence of an ecological system, within 
which man must derive his sustenance, dictates limits to man's 
transformation of his surroundings. Heat dissipation, disposal of 
radioactive and toxic chemical wastes, reduction in the number of 
living species, and many other interactions between man and his 
environment must ultimately be constrained in some manner such 
that this "spaceship earth" will continue to support human life.H 
Currently, growth of population and production means concomi-
tant growth of environmental pollution.45 This adverse environmen-
tal impact, if projected into the future, also provides a limiting 
factor on future growth. As pessimistic as anyone of these trends 
appears to be for the world's future, it is their interaction which the 
report considers deadly. By a phenomenon known as feedback, one 
variable's growth accentuates problems in other areas. 46 Population 
growth necessitates additional food, but advances in food produc-
tion may require exploitation of non-renewable resources and result 
in additional pollution. Eventually each variable acts as a limiting 
factor on the others: high levels of pollution may limit food supplies 
and endanger human beings; dwindling resources may limit growth 
of production and thereby decrease world income; large populations 
may decrease each individual's opportunities for diversity and ma-
terial comfort. 
11 [d. at 25-44. 
12 [d. at 46-54. 
1:1 [d. at 54-69. 
11 [d. at 85. 
15 [d. at 69-81. 
" See "Chapter I - The Nature of Exponential Growth," id. at 25-44. 
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C. Suggested Policies and Initial Reactions to the World:3 Model 
LIMITS could truly be labelled a harbinger of doom were it not for 
the fact that the authors attempted to define conditions whereby 
the consequences of overshoot and collapse could be avoided. 
Through simulation of alternative conditions, it was possible to find 
sets of variable relationships that were "viable" over the long run. 
The goal was to attain sustainable relationships between variables 
that would be capable of satisfying the basic material requirements 
of all the world's population without sudden and uncontrollable 
collapseY The attainment of this goal required constant levels of 
population and capital, a condition termed global equilibrium.48 In 
the view of the authors: "The state of global equilibrium could be 
designed so that the basic material needs of each person on earth 
are satisfied and each person has an equal opportunity to realize his 
individual human potential. "49 
By further specifying a long time horizon for the existence of 
global equilibrium and long average lifetimes for the population, it 
was possible to work back to a set of "minimum" requirements 
necessary to reach a state of global equilibrium. These requirements 
included: 1) capital plant and population held at a constant size; 
2) all input and output rates-births, deaths, investment, and de-
preciation-kept to a minimum; 3) levels of capital and population 
as well as the ratio of the two, set in accordance with the values of 
society.50 A scenario compatible with these requirements involves a 
stability in growth of population and industrial capital prior to the 
end of this century, a large decrease in use ofresources from produc-
tion and its reorientation toward services and food, and a massive 
reduction of pollution generated by industry and agriculture. 
LIMITS insists that such a global equilibrium does not mean stag-
nation, since population and capital are the only quantities that 
must be constant in the equilibrium state. Activities which do not 
require large amounts of irreplaceable resources or produce environ-
mental degradation could continue, although most present in-
dustrial processes and products would require considerable transfor-
mation or elimination. Technology of a selective kind would be de-
sirable and necessary, especially that directed at pollution abate-
ment of those industrial processes present in an equilibrium state."l 
H [d. at 158. 
" [d. at 171. 
" [d. at 24. 
51' [d. at 173-74. 
" [d. at 174-75. 
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The degree of equality in material comfort or opportunity com-
patible with an equilibrium economy would not automatically be 
solved in the transition to this condition, but neither would it neces-
sarily be aggravated. As is presently true, political decisions would 
have to be based on the difficult trade-oft's associated with this 
problem. The authors of LIMITS strongly believe that it is a myth 
that continued patterns of present growth will lead humanity closer 
to some equality of welfare or opportunity. 52 They do recognize a 
trade-off which transition requires: 
Equilibrium would require trading certain human freedoms, such as 
producing unlimited numbers of children or consuming uncontrolled 
amounts of resources, for other freedoms, such as relief from pollution 
and crowding and the threat of collapse of the world system. It is possi-
ble that new freedoms might also arise-universal and unlimited educa-
tion, leisure for creativity and inventiveness, and, most important of all, 
the freedom from hunger and poverty enjoyed by such a small fraction 
of the world's people todayY 
The authors of LIMITS clearly considered the transition from un-
controlled growth to global equilibrium desirable, but they did not 
address the means of making the transition. They called for more 
information in order to manage the transition, as well as more par-
ticipation in designing suitable policies. In accord with their train-
ing and bias, they called for such additional information and partic-
ipation to occur within a "system structure" so that it could be 
explicitly understood and its consequences upon global conditions 
determined. However, they also stressed the need for a simultaneous 
start at solving problems while further information was gathered: 
... we end on a note of urgency. We hope that intensive study and 
debate will proceed simultaneously with an ongoing program of action. 
The details are not yet specified, but the general direction for action is 
obvious. Enough is known already to analyze many proposed policies in 
terms of their tendencies to promote or to regulate growth.5~ 
Pursuant to this urgency, they strengthened their call for a con-
scious change of direction: 
Taking no action to solve these problems is equivalent to taking strong 
action. Every day of continued exponential growth brings the world 
system closer to the ultimate limits to that growth. A decision to do 
,,' [d. at 174-80. 
,,:! [d. at 179-80. 
" [d. at 182. 
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nothing is a decision to increase the risk of collapse. We cannot say with 
certainty how much longer mankind can postpone initiating deliberate 
control of his growth before he will have lost the chance for control. We 
suspect on the basis of present knowledge of the physical constraints of 
the planet that the growth phase cannot continue for another one 
hundred years. Again, because of the delays in the system, if the global 
society waits until those constraints are unmistakably apparent, it will 
have waited to long. 55 
The reactions to LIMITS at the March 2, 1972, Smithsonian Sym-
posium rested primarily upon intuition and professional prejudice. 
Politicians guardedly expressed concern over the dire predictions, 
while simultaneously staying away from any endorsement of action, 
except for further study and contemplation. Businessmen ques-
tioned the adequacy of evidence that growth must come to an end 
if world collapse is to be prevented. Environmentalists jumped at 
the chance to use the study as hard evidence for their long-standing 
contention that curbs must be placed upon man's activities so that 
a harmony with nature can be achieved. Economists dismissed the 
study as one more version of Malthusian analysis, which had been 
continually disproven by progress and growth. Journalists played 
each side off against the other, giving equal credence to each com-
ment and being overwhelmed by the inconclusiveness of the de-
bate.56 Very few of these early reactions were based upon a careful 
reading of LIMITS. Rather, they depended upon the publicity re-
leased by Potomac Associates prior to the Smithsonian Symposium, 
the verbal presentation by Dennis Meadows, and the subsequent 
discussion at the Symposium itselfY 
" Id. at 183. 
" Various reactions at the Symposium are reflected in Reinhold, Warning on Growth Perils 
Is Examined at Symposium, supra note 25; Lewis, Ecology and Politics: I, New York Times, 
March 4, 1972, at 27, col. 1; Baker, The Machine, the Doom and the Fool, New York Times, 
March 5, 1972, at IV, 13, col. 3; Lewis, Ecology and Politics: II, New York Times, March 6, 
1972 at 33, col. 1; Hodson, Growth and Survival, New York Times, March 8, 1972 at 43, col. 
2; To Grow or Not to Grow, NEWSWEEK, March 13, 1972, at 102-03; Hard Sell, supra note 20, 
at 1088-91; On Reaching a State of Global Equilibrium, New York Times, March 13, 1972 at 
35, col. 2; The Ultimate 'Silent Spring'?, CHEMICAL WEEK, March 15,1972, at 40; Kriss, When 
Growth Becomes Cancerous, SATURDAY REVIEW, March 18, 1972, at 22. 
,,7 For a sampling of reviews, see World Model Forecasts Collapse, CHEMICAL AND ENGINEER-
ING NEWS, March 6, 1972, at 10; Economic Growth Versus Human Survival, 101 SCIENCE NEWS 
165-66 (March 1972); The MIT Report: Is Doomsday Really That Close?, BUSINESS WEEK, 
March 11, 1972, at 97-98; a series of two articles by Silk, Questions Must Be Raised About 
the Imminence of the Disaster, New York Times, March 13, 1972, at 35, col. 2 and On the 
Imminence of Disaster, New York Times, March 14, 1972, at 43, col. 3, condensed and 
reprinted as Silk, Questioning the Imminence of Disaster, 140 CURRENT 3-8 (May 1972); 
Gilluly, Limits to Growth: Debating the Future, 101 SCIENCE NEWS 202-04 (March 1972); 
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III. CRITICAL RESPONSES To World:2 AND World:3 
While reviews of LIMITS were diminishing in the popular press by 
mid-1972, a massive critical reaction to the global models used in 
WORLD DYNAMICS and LIMITS was building in the scientific arena. 
Glimpses of this debate reached the public when certain fundamen-
tal weaknesses of these models were charged.58 While the reports on 
this debate are voluminous,59 the discussion itself can be categorized 
into a few fundamental areas of concern which consistently appear 
in the responses to the global models behind the Predicament of 
Mankind. The remarks which follow are not intended to be compre-
hensive, but rather are designed to convey some of the diversity of 
opinion concerning the entire modeling effort and its merits. 
A. Criticism of the Model 
The problems dealt with in LIMITS and WORLD DYNAMICS demand 
long-term solutions, even though these solutions require rapid initi-
ation if there is to be any hope of moderating adverse consequences. 
Some critics argue that the M.I.T. studies ignore short-term prob-
lems like famine, threat of nuclear war, and political unrest and 
that they wrongly divert public attention toward distant problems.60 
According to such criticism, what little effort and goodwill exists for 
solving world problems must be concentrated on immediate areas 
of concern and not diffused over complex and distant issues. These 
critics suggest that people may be left feeling helpless in the face of 
overwhelming "trends" emanating from "fatalistic doom-
mongering."61 Thus far, no significant efforts have been diverted 
toward studying, let alone designing, solutions to long-term prob-
Edelson, A Computer Views our Future with Alarm, BOOK WORLD, March 26, 1972, at 13; 
Hirst and Schuck, The Limits to Growth: A Review, 36 THE LIVING WILDERNESS 38-39 (Spring 
1972). 
" For examples of the "exposure" of these weaknesses, see Fall of Rome, THE ECONOMIST, 
June 3, 1972, at 78-81; Homilies for the Club of Rome, 238 NATURE 237-38 (August 1972); 
Limits to 'Limits', 102 SCIENCE NEWS 153 (September 1972); More Coals of Fire for Club of 
Rome, 239 NATURE 248-49 (September 1972); Streatfeild, No Limit to the Growth Debate, 73 
NEW SCIENTIST 531-33 (1973). 
,,' Nordhaus, World Dynamics:Measurement Without Data, 331 ECONOMIC JOURNAL 1156-
83 (December 1973); Forrester, The Debate on World Dynamics: A Response to Nordhaus 
(December 1973), published in: 4 POUCY SCIENCES (June 1974); Naughton, A Little Global 
Difficulty, 42 ENCOUNTER 72-77 (January 1974). 
'" Haq, The Limits to Growth: A Critique, 9 FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 8 (December 1972); 
Beckerman, The Myth of Environmental Catastrophe, 24 NATIONAL REVIEW 1315 (November 
1972). 
" Dator, The Limits to the Limits to Growth, WORLD FUTURE SOCIETY, May 10, 1972, at 
10. 
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lems. This inaction may be for good reason, since people "discount" 
future possibilities very heavily in determining current behavior.62 
Further, the short-term problems are often simply manifestations of 
the longer-term directions toward which the basic variables of the 
Meadows study are headed. The problem remains, however, to in-
troduce perspective toward the long-run into short-term efforts at 
alleviating world problems. 
Population growth may be the root of the problem, according to 
the M.LT. study. These models develop relationships between pop-
ulation growth and concomitant changes in food requirements, pol-
lution, resource depletion, and capital requirements. Thus, explo-
sive increases in population result in explosive pressures on the 
other variables in the world system. 63 The population level is also 
likely to overshoot the support levels of other necessary variables 
such as food, resulting in a built-in tendency for the system to crash. 
These premises are, of course, controversia1.64 First, some observers 
read the empirical evidence on demography differently than the 
Meadows group did. They argue that: 
. . . fertility has already started to decline in a number of countries. Of 
the sixty-six countries for which accurate data are available, as many 
as fifty-six show a decline. Most demographers are agreed by now that 
the 1970's will see the population growth rate reach a plateau so that 
by 1980 population growth rates will tend to decline, slowly at first and 
ra pidly thereafter. 65 
Such an argument alone is insufficient to diffuse the global cata-
strophe predicted in LIMITS. Since even this "natural" reduction in 
growth rate will lead to much larger levels of population before the 
slowdown takes effect. But some population "optimists" foresee the 
possibility of going further in checking population growth, even at 
low income levels, by vigorous programs. Such a possibility is not 
built into the LIMITS model, which links fertility and mortality 
largely to economic factors so that only increasing per capita in-
dustrial production can provide the education and reinforcement 
necessary to reduce population.66 
" Linstone, On Discounting The Future, 4 TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING AND SOCIAL CHANGE 
335-38 (1973). 
'" For a counter argument concerning the link between population growth and pollution, 
see Fisher, Population and Environmental Quality, 19 PUBLIC POLICY 19-35 (Winter 1971). 
" For an overview of the criticism of the population sector, see Page, The Population Sub-
System, in DOOM, supra note 5, at 43-55; Page, Population Forecasting, in DOOM, supra note 
5, at 159-74. 
" Haq, The Limits to Growth: A Critique, supra note 60. 
" [d. 
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Other critics turn the argument around and use "inevitable popu-
lation growth" as an argument why growth cannot stop. Rather than 
attack population growth today and only see the results much later, 
they argue for increasing the resources to support these massesY 
The prospect of this same "inevitable" population growth can also 
compel a different conclusion, namely that stabilization of the world 
system leading to global equilibrium must begin immediately. Fur-
ther, the industrialized countries are presumed to be capable of 
reducing demand on world support levels so that population growth 
can be handled over an interim when its growth is somehow moder-
ated. 6R 
If population cannot long continue to grow at its current rate, a 
unique optimal long-term level remains unclear.69 An optimal level 
requires trade-offs with levels of personal freedom, as well as mate-
rial and social standards of living. These choices are clearly reflected 
in a description of the probable consequences of continued growth: 
Doom does not necessarily mean that man will soon cease to exist, but 
that he is perceptibly evolving toward the life style of the great majority 
of organisms on this planet-a life without variety or choice or beauty. 
This kind of doom may be much harder to avoid than extinction. 70 
What sense can be made out of the conflicting views on popula-
tion? Was LIMITS too pessimistic about the urgency of the need to 
curtail birth rates or, alternatively, about the possibility that devel-
oping nations can internally spawn demographic transitions toward 
more stable populations? The former might be true if technology 
could be counted upon to provide food and relatively pollution-free 
products in quantities far beyond the most optimistic assumptions 
of the World:3 study. The latter might be true if developing nations 
could follow the lead of industrial countries and decrease birth rates 
as economic prosperity increases. It remains, however, to be seen 
how these countries could break out of low-level traps where small 
increases in income are eaten by up growing populations. Regardless 
of the view held concerning the LIMITS study, population remains a 
crucial ingredient in any projection about the future. It is even more 
" Bruce-Briggs, Against the Neo-Malthusians, 58 COMMENTARY 29 (July 1974). 
" Hapke, The Limits to Growth: Implications for the United States, 4 ZPG NATIONAL 
REPORTER 8-10 (May 1972). 
"' For a discussion of possible population models, see Population Reference Bureau, Man's 
Population Predicament: Three Models of the Future, 71 THE ENVIRONMENTAL JOURNAL 29-31 
(October 1971). 
711 P.W. BARKLEY AND D.W. SECKLER, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL DECAY 5 
(1972). 
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crucial if it is viewed as the cause of pressure on other variables, as 
it was in the M.LT. study. 
Views concerning resource exhaustion separate the technological 
optimists from the pessimists. 71 The optimists wish to project the 
experience of the last century forward and assume that technology 
will allow exploitation of ever-poorer deposits of raw materials and 
will create a substitute for any material which is exhausted, thus 
leading to general abundance even if specific materials approach 
extinction. 72 If this technological adaptation process is able to occur, 
one of the restraints to continued growth, natural resource scarcity 
and eventual exhaustion, will have been removed. 73 
The pessimists, sometimes known as "Malthusians," view tech-
nology as a mixed blessing. Even if new sources of energy and raw 
materials could be developed, the attendant society costs must be 
considered. 74 Certainly there are social and environmental costs 
beyond the market prices (as currently measured) paid by consum-
ers of this new technology.75 Radiation hazards, heat dissipation, 
disruption of natural ecosystems, pollution of water and air, and 
many other spin-off effects of technology cause some critics to ques-
tion whether the general welfare is actually increased by such tech-
nological discoveries, assuming that they are sustainable into the 
future. 76 Others accept the necessity of continued technological 
"fixes," but question their eventual effectiveness. 77 
The World:2 and World:3 models developed a single variable to 
;1 For a discussion of these "ideological poles" or extreme positions about the future of the 
world, see Boyd, World Dynamics: A Note, 177 SCIENCE 518 (August 11, 1972). 
72 Sharpe, Limits to Growth· Review, 9 SOCIETY 92 (September/October 1972); Patel, The 
Club of Rome Report - A Dissenting View, 1 ASPEN INSTITUTE QUARTERLY 5 (Fall 1972); 
Wiener, The Future of Economic Activity, 408 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY 52 (July 
1973). 
73 For a description of how the world models might work with more optimistic assumptions 
about technology and resources, see Page, The Non-Renewable Resources Sub-System, in 
DOOM, supra note 5, at 33-42. 
" For a "pessimist's" view see E.J. Misham, TECHNOLOGY AND GROWTH: THE PRICE WE PAY 
(1969). 
" For a discussion of how economists view the pricing mechanism and LIMITS, see Gordon, 
Today's Apocalypses and Yesterday's, 58 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 106-10 (May 1973); 
Rosenberg, Innovative Responses to Materials Shortages, 58 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 111-
18 (May 1973); Bradley, Increasing Scarcity: The Case of Energy Resources, 58 AMERICAN 
ECONOMIC REVIEW 119-25 (May 1973). 
;, Critical or guarded views of technology's future role are found in Schatz, Grim Model, 
24 AMERICAS 58-59 (May 1972), Holley and Seifert, Further Comments: Limits to Growth, 64 
TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 68-69 (July/August 1972); Forrester, The Fledgling Cheermonger, 73 
CAMBRIDGE REVIEW 70-73 (February 1973). 
n Weinberg, Prudence and Technology: A Technologist's Response to Predictions- of 
Catastrophe, 21 BIOSCIENCE 338 (April 1, 1972). 
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represent worldwide pollution and then used it in determining how 
other variables would relate to it. But, of course, pollution is far 
more complex and diverse than its representation in these models. 
Is this gross aggregation useful in representing possible future 
conditions? One analysis of the pollution sector concludes: "The 
World 3 sub-system advances neither our understanding of pollu-
tion, nor of its interaction with other aspects of world behaviour."7K 
One reason for this rejection was the predicted oversight of local and 
regional pollution problems, which would probably generate further 
concern and social response. But, "by aggregating all pollutants, 
and assuming that they behave in some composite way, attention 
is drawn away from what are urgent, and still soluble problems, and 
diverted into speculation upon an imaginary race against time be-
tween Life and Global asphyxiation."79 
A concomitant assumption of the LIMITS model was that the most 
optimistic reduction of pollution possible would be to a level one-
fourth that which existed in 1970. Critics have questioned the pre-
sumed impossibility of greater reductions in this world-wide level.Ro 
These critics assume that pollution will become so concentrated at 
local levels that social-political reactions will occur which, in turn, 
will call forth appropriate technological mechanisms to produce 
environmental improvement or avoid continued degradation. One 
key element in this assumption is that economic growth probably 
will generate the social-political pressures for correction via a grow-
ing demand for the amenity of a more livable environment. 
Human response to changing conditions is viewed by many as the 
most important missing element in the LIMITS model. Man's learn-
ing capacity and adaptability are viewed as extraordinary, and thus 
the model's predicted overshooting of limits and world collapse is 
suspect. The argument hinges on the "unpredictability" of man: 
For it is in the realm of human actions that major discontinuities have 
occurred in the past and may occur again, while man's history provides 
not one single example for a sudden discontinuity in physical attributes 
of the world. It is in the nature of purposeful adaptation that the course 
of events can be changed dramatically if social constraints are experi-
enced as intolerable, if aspirations remain unfulfilled and if confidence 
in the ruling political powers disintegrates. It makes no sense in this 
context to talk of exponential growth in a finite world. Man's inventive-
" Marstrand and Sinclair, The Pollution Sub-System, in DOOM, supra note 5, at 88. 
7U [d. 
~, Singer, Do We Dare To Grow?, 215 THE NATION 527-31 (November 1972). 
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ness in changing social arrangements is without limits, even if not with-
out hazards. xI 
This line of reasoning does not envision growth rates continuing 
indefinitely, but considers physical limits misleading, since an ad-
aptation process could ease society into new equilibria. 
It is certainly true that no social adaptation process was built into 
LIMITS. A set of "optimistic" assumptions was made, however, con-
cerning how far this adaptation could conceivably go in modifying 
the behavior of the variables. This refusal of the authors of LIMITS 
to rely heavily on social adaptation stems perhaps from the system 
dynamics belief that social systems are counter-intuitive and that 
some decisions must be made about the future of the world before 
the end result of status quo policies becomes widely evident. The 
critics have not clarified their basis for ignoring the recognition lag 
which LIMITS assumed societies experience concerning problems 
whose impact will be felt only after it may be too late to take correc-
tive action to forestall the eventual disaster. 
B. Global Equilibrium 
The necessity of stabilizing levels of population and material out-
put, in balance with the finiteness of resources and the environ-
ment, is the policy prescription of LIMITS. This prescription has 
generated perhaps even greater controversy than have the weak-
nesses of the specific model used to conclude that such an equilib-
rium offered the only feasible means of perpetuating global human 
prosperity. Many of the criticisms aimed at specific aspects of the 
model reach the implicit or explicit conclusion that any substanti-
ated weakness of the World:3 model invalidates its predictons that 
global equilibrium will be essential. In addition, there has been 
strong sentiment that such a prescription spells another kind of 
doom for large segments of the globe: 
Perhaps the most devastating criticism of the Club of Rome stop-the-
growth thesis comes from those who argue that it is a middle-class 
movement that goes directly against the interests of the poor-to say 
nothing of the billions of people who barely stay alive in the underdevel-
oped parts of the world. The problem of the poor nations is not pollution. 
Their problem is hunger and deprivation. 82 
Thus, many observers are as repulsed by the suggested remedy in 
" Jahoda, Postscript on Social Change, in DOOM, supra note 5, at 215. 
" Growth or No Growth?, FORBES, May 15, 1975, at 100. 
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LIMITS as by its predictions of eventual catastrophe: "This status 
quo prescription-the report calls it 'global equilibrium' -is as 
chilling as the doomsday prophecy. "83 Of course, the unpleasantness 
of global equilibrium is not sufficient to eliminate its necessity. 
Attacks on LIMITS' structure and assumptions provide a more con-
structive way to "prove" the invalidity of its policy prescriptions. 
An associated controversy centers around the consequences of 
such a global equilibrium, assuming that it becomes necessary. 
What distribution of product would exist? Could economies stabi-
lize at such levels and remain there indefinitely?84 Will it also result 
necessarily in an ecological balance, such that pollution does not 
increase? Such questions reflect the deep concern and distrust that 
people have of a no-growth world. The majority views growth of 
product and technology as a means of reducing income inequalities 
and promoting the general welfare, while no-growth is assumed to 
do just the opposite. It will take considerably more than LIMITS to 
convince peoples and nations that continued economic growth is 
neither beneficial nor possible. Most ask why it is not possible, as a 
limiting case, to have continued economic growth without asso-
ciated pollution and population growth. 
C. A bsence of Solutions 
The work of Forrester and Meadows has been termed irresponsi-
ble doomsday mongering because it fails to suggest the means by 
which solutions can be found to the problems it raises. Critics argue 
that while the studies call for radical changes in worldwide behav-
ior, they hardly specify how painful this transition will be and for 
whom. Furthermore, the studies ignore the basic question of mobi-
lizing a world effort.85 Related criticism involves the potentially de-
structive nature of the dire predictions themselves. Even if the pre-
dictions are accurate, they may bring forth unintended responses. 
People may feel helpless to avert such consequences and lapse into 
", Can the World Survive Economic Growth?, TIME, August 14, 1972, at 56. 
" The consequences of no-growth economics are only now beginning to be explored. See 
TOWARD A STEADy-STATE ECONOMY (H.E. Daly ed. 1973); M. Olson and H. Landsberg (eds.) 
The No-Growth Society, 102 DAEDALUS 1-245 (Fall 1973); ECONOMIC GROWTH VS. THE 
ENVIRONMENT (W.A. Johnson & J. Hardesty eds. 1971); THE ECONOMIC GROWTH CONTROVERSY 
(A. Weintraub, et al. eds. 1973). 
xc, Even observers who accept the basic conclusion that collapse is feasible object to the lack 
of specific solutions offered. See Heilbroner, Growth and Survival, supra note 59. For sug-
gested scenarios different from those of Forrester and Meadows, see Gabbor, The New Res-
ponsibilities of Science, 72 SCIENCE POLICY 1-8 (May/June 1972); Gladwyn, The Logic of 
Growth, 3 ECOLOGIST 130-33 (1973). 
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anxiety, depression, and social as well as political radicalism. xn An-
other result may be a growing split between have and have-not 
nations, with confrontation accentuatedY Neither of these com-
plaints involves the validity of the predictions; rather they ask what 
will be the likely consequence if such predictions are widely be-
lieved. Perhaps they highlight some of the consequences of the wide-
spread debate over the issues raised in LIMITS. 
IV. LASTING CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE M.I.T. WORK ON GLOBAL 
MODELS 
Many of the above criticisms concerning World:2 and World:3 as 
models of the world's predicament do identify actual weaknesses. 
However, a number of valuable results have flowed from the Club 
of Rome's support for these global studies and the ensuing contro-
versy. The time which has elapsed since the debut of LIMITS has 
been sufficient to separate the strengths and weaknesses of this 
particular global modeling effort and to indicate its overall contri-
bution. 
A. Weaknesses 
The behavior of any world model built by the use of systems 
dynamics is highly dependent upon the assumptions and data used, 
with social phenomena being extremely difficult to handle. Some 
critics charge that the model designed in LIMITS was useless: "If the 
work is intended to be a serious statement about the structure of the 
global economy and society and to inform debate over the policy 
issues stemming from growth, it is a fraud."gg Other, more charita-
ble, observers charge that LIMITS relied too heavily on a priori for-
mulations of relationships between variables, and thus was simply 
a means of articulating the intuitive values and subjective prefer-
ences of the model builders.89 Further, manipulation of such a 
"subjective" model could result in any conclusions desired by the 
authors. Critics view with disapproval what they consider to be a 
failure adequately to incorporate available knowledge as data and 
assumptions. 90 If "equally plausible" assumptions are substituted 
"" DeNike, The Dangers of Dire Predictions, 72 THE FUTURIST 118-20 (June 1972). 
" Dickson, The Limits to Growth and World Development, 72 NEW SCIENTIST 306-07 (May 
1972). 
"" Koehler, Limits to Growth - Review, 35 JOURNAL OF POLITICS 513 (May 1973). 
" For an example of this argument, see Bray, Growing Strong, 14 ENVIRONMENT 43-45 (May 
1972). 
DO This weakness made the model suspect in many persons' eyes, including the World Bank. 
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for some of those used in the LIMITS model, considerably different 
conclusions are reached by some critics who likewise find the model 
to be very sensitive to these changes in inputs. 91 
Some claim that system dynamics is utterly simplistic and tends 
to reinvent economics, demography, and many other disciplines in 
the form of a few equations.92 Given this simplicity, the resulting 
global models are deemed insufficient to provide policy guidelines, 
although they can be useful as first steps in understanding the com-
plex interactions of the global system.93 
One of the most obvious weaknesses of LIMITS To GROWTH has 
been the lack of public documentation for the World: 3 model un-
derlying the book. When LIMITS was first released to the public in 
March, 1972, the detailed model structure was lacking. The model 
was inappropriate at that point for inclusion in a book aimed at the 
general public. Promises were made then regarding quick release of 
the technical documentation so that the scientific community could 
replicate and verify the study's results. Inordinate delays occurred 
in making the documentation finally available to the public. 94 There 
has still not been any public explanation for this unfortunate delay, 
leaving the authors open to the charge that they attempted to head 
off the arguments of critics by revising the basic model prior to 
release. However, there had been limited distribution of the under-
lying technical model in a preliminary version to various research-
ers. 
Another weakness was the over-emphasis on the model's present 
usefulness as input to policy decisions. In light of the grossly aggre-
gated structure and hasty construction, only system dynamics advo-
cates were willing to place unrestrained confidence in the model and 
its suggested alternatives to global catastrophe. Other sympathetic 
observers could agree with the need for such a model, but found 
themselves stymied by the controversy regarding specific weak-
nesses in the model which might invalidate the policies suggested 
to achieve global equilibrium. While it is impossible to refute the 
See, More Coals of Fire For Club of Rome, supra note 58. 
" A sample of this type of critical analysis was widely reported as a "flaw" in the M.LT. 
models. See Oeriemans, Tellings, and DeVries, World Dynamics: Social Feedback May Give 
Hope for the Future, 238 NATURE 251-55 (August 1972); Homilies for the Club of Rome, supra 
note 58; Limits to 'Limits', supra note 58; St. John, Fear and Fantasy in Future Folly, New 
York Times, December 5, 1972 at 43, col. 3. 
" Kaysen, The Computer That Printed Out WOLF, supra note 59. 
0:' For example, see Foy, Painting the World With a Wide Brush, 72 NEW SCIENTIST 261-63 
(May 1972); Bray, A Model of Doom, 238 NATURE 112 (July 1972). 
" DYNAMICS OF GROWTH IN A FINITE WORLD, supra note 31. 
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urgency the authors felt for these problems, many critics found their 
suggested solutions unpalatable and not substantiated by irrefuta-
ble models. 
Another problem involved the paucity of empirical support for 
many of the relationships posited in the models. In some cases, both 
supportive and contradictory information existed for the relation-
ships built into the models. That this data was not fully incorpo-
rated into the underlying studies opened the entire exercise to 
charges of subjective reconstruction of existing knowledge. Cer-
tainly there is room for the authors to reject this charge and to claim 
that they reviewed the essential information. However, traditional 
disciplines were able to criticize the use of data by the authors of 
LIMITS even more readily because of the rush to communicate the 
model in a popular manner and to "spread the word" about prob-
lems judged critical and imminent by the authors and supporters 
prior to completion of the model. 
A final, related weakness was the relative lack of new material in 
LIMITS such as would justify its urgent publication prior to ironing 
out some of the problems mentioned above. WORLD DYNAMICS and 
LIMITS are essentially the same world model, the difference in the 
public's eye being the sensationalism of the latter. Many critics 
were disappointed that LIMITS did not delve more deeply into the 
relationships first posited in WORLD DYNAMICS. It is really the tech-
nical report THE DYNAMICS OF GROWTH IN A FINITE WORLD which is a 
sequel to WORLD DYNAMICS because it matches the World:2 report 
in providing technical information on World:3. LIMITS, then, was 
left open to the charge that the authors and supporters wanted the 
publicity generated by it, but were unwilling simultaneously to sub-
ject themselves to the scientific criticism which could only be gener-
ated from analysis of the underlying technical structure of the 
World:3 model. 
B. Strengths 
There are certainly strengths to counterbalance these weaknesses. 
First of all, the world needed a jolt to its complacent attitude about 
world problems and particularly to its apathy concerning the future 
of man on this globe. The Club of Rome's support for the World:2 
and World:3 models and the related publicity was timely in awaken-
ing public opinion and controversy on these important issues. Per-
haps the less than strictly professional or scientific method used to 
" DOOM, supra note 5. 
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present the results of these models and their "message" was worth 
the price paid in terms of the researchers' and supporters' impugned 
respectability by the established scientific community. 
Few would dispute that these models were fresh analyses of pre-
sumably interconnected problems. The system dynamics approach 
did sweep aside the assumed hinderance of traditionally "narrow" 
disciplines. It is unfortunate that so much of this response was 
emotional and even hysterical, instead of reasoned and construc-
tive. There were weaknesses which critics could have exposed 
calmly. While the public controversy, and even sensationalism, has 
seemed unprofessional to many in the scientific community, it has 
been healthy in prompting a more concerted response by the critics 
than might otherwise have occurred. The problems involved are too 
important to remain exclusively within academic circles. There is a 
compelling need for scientists to re-examine their assumptions and 
work toward broad explanations of long-term global growth and 
progress. 
V. BEYOND LIMITS: MANKIND AT THE TURNING POINT AND 
OTHER MODELING EFFORTS 
This model-building activity has provided impetus for additional 
research on global problems. Perhaps the controversy has been 
worthwhile because the refinement of global model building has 
been accelerated far beyond the level which would have been 
achieved without this push. Regardless of the weaknesses of these 
initial models, they have crystallized attention around verifying or 
countering their conclusions. This crystallization fulfills one of the 
hopes of the LIMITS authors and supporters that more concern and 
attention would be directed toward conditions which might have 
critical and sometimes irreversible global consequences. 
The debate prompted by LIMITS is perhaps best reflected by 
MODELS OF DOOM, the first reasoned critique by persons who had 
access to the underlying technical model. This response has been 
strengthened by the subsequent rebuttal by the LIMITS authors. In-
terchanges of this nature come closest to the open, scholarly debate 
expected by the scientific community.96 Another response has 
emerged in the form of stimuli provided to other research on growth 
and its consequences. This work often attacks one sub-sector of 
global models and attempts to improve the knowledge of relation-
ships and possible future outcomes. Such inquiry has probably been 
.. Meadows, et al., A Response to Sussex, 217-40 in DOOM, supra note 5. 
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given a boost by the controversy over the LIMITS models, as well as 
by a series of ensuing world events which have underscored the 
urgency and critical nature of this debate. 97 
The Club of Rome has remained active in supporting further re-
search and in pressing for policy changes in light of their studies and 
conclusions to date. Their first general meeting after LIMITS was 
released, occurring in Paris during January, 1973, provided the Club 
with a chance to reassess its goals and the reactions to its involve-
ment in supporting the LIMITS studies. To a great extent the Club 
had become too exclusively identified with the notion of zero growth 
and its connotations. Even prior to this Paris meeting, however, 
additional projects were receiving support. These projects entailed 
expanded and disaggregated research on the "predicament of man-
kind" and methods of assessing its future condition. 9R Another gen-
eral meeting was held in Tokyo during October, 1973, to review the 
results of twenty different research efforts, some supported by the 
Club indirectly. The Tokyo meeting also provided an opportunity 
to reaffirm their concern about the study of and solutions to this 
growing list of global problems: 
(1) the abolition of war and violence, (2) the reassessment of economic 
growth objectives, (3) the conservation of the world's unrenewable re-
sources, (4) harmonious socio-economic development, (5) stress on the 
quality of life, (6) more equitable distribution of wealth, (7) the orienta-
tion and management of technology, (8) population policies, (9) the 
need for the participation of individuals in decision-making and (10) the 
development of human potential. 99 
In pursuing these visionary goals, the Club continued to push for 
policy redirection. A meeting of "minor" heads of state sponsored 
" Efforts to catalog this growing research effort have been spearheaded by the Woodrow 
Wilson International Center For Scholars at the Smithsonian Institution. RESEARCH ON 
GROWTH: AN INVENTORY OF EFFORTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND ELSEWHERE, Woodrow Wilson 
International Center For Scholars - Smithsonian Institution (Preliminary Edition, March 
1974). See also WORLD MODELS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STATE OF THE ART, Futures Lab 
(August 1975). 
" A statement by the Club outlines activities and policy stands as the result of the Paris 
Meeting. Club of Rome, The Club of Rome Answers Its Critics-And Pushes On, 12 WAR/ 
PEACE REPORT 21-29 (May/June 1973). See also Peccei, The Limits to Growth: Interview 
with the President of the Club of Rome, Aurelio Peccei, 26 UNESCO COURIER 11-12 (January 
1973); Peccei, Shoulder to Shoulder to Shoulder to Shaul, New York Times, February 4,1973 
at 35, col. 2; The Club of Rome-The New Threshold, 5 TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING AND 
SOCIAL CHANGE 335-48 (1973). 
" Tokyo Conference of the Club of Rome, 21 JAPAN QUARTERLY 10-14 (January/March 
1974). 
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by the Club was held in Salzburg during February, 1974. 100 
Several Club of Rome "second generation" studies will serve as 
examples of the mushrooming field of global modeling efforts. 101 
Dennis Gabor and a group of technological optimists, with support 
from the Club and the Canadian government, have set out to ex-
plore the potential of science and technology in pushing back the 
limits forecast by the M.LT. models, especially those in the sectors 
of non-renewable materials, food, and energy.102 While the report is 
still in the preparation stage, their findings indicate that political 
and social limits will become problems long before actual physical 
limits could be reached. This discussion shifts the emphasis to man-
agerial and behavioral attributes as critical factors in the world's 
future, a point perhaps underemphasized in the LIMITS studies. 
Developing countries have long resented the nature and findings 
of the LIMITS models because of their implications for the poorer 
nations. Since this resentment has been especially strong in Latin 
America, a group at the Institute Bariloche in Argentina has set out 
to look at world futures from the viewpoint of the Third World, a 
viewpoint which encompasses a set of assumptions different from 
that of the LIMITS authors. loa This examination is intended to utilize 
an egalitarian model concerned with the prerequisites of food, shel-
ter, education, and the other elements necessary to provide a decent 
level of welfare for the world's masses. These needs take account of 
varying population growth rates and welfare requirements on a re-
gional basis. While very theoretical in nature, the study makes a 
series of assumptions about relations between developing and devel-
oped regions and explores the length of time remaining for the Third 
World to continue growth and still provide minimum welfare prere-
quisites. 
A third study views continued population growth as inevitable 
and explores the demands on world infrastructure to handle a 
doubling of population in the next thirty-three years. A group of 
economists at the University of Amsterdam is involved in determin-
ing whether the prerequisites for this population can be provided 
,00 'Medium' Nations Find a Forum in Salzburg, New York Times, February 10, 1974 at 
22, col. 5. 
,., For a description of these studies, see Alexander King on The Club of Rome Today, 4 
SIMULATION IN THE SERVICE OF SOCIETY 1-4 (August 1974). A completely different type of world 
model is represented by the first three studies in the Institute for World Order's "world order 
models project." ON THE CREATION OF A JUST WORLD ORDER (S.H. Mendlovitz ed. 1975); R. 
LOTHARI, FOOTSTEPS INTO THE FUTURE (1975); R.A. FALK, A STUDY OF FUTURE WORLDS (1975). 
'02 Alexander King on the Club of Rome Today, supra note 101. 
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and what the impact of population doubling will be from the stand-
point of economics as well as from that of human suffering. 104 
One of the studies supported by the Club of Rome and authored 
by two of its members became the "Second Report to the Club of 
Rome." It was presented at a general meeting in Berlin during Octo-
ber, 1974. This second report was termed a "Son of LIMITS"105 be- . 
cause it deals with global variables through a computer model of 
possible future conditions. The authors coordinated their research 
for this report, MANKIND AT THE TURNING POINT (TURNING POINT),108 
from Case Western Reserve University and Hanover Technical Uni-
versity. Unlike LIMITS, this work reflects a disaggregation of the 
world into ten sub-regions lO7 and introduces policy strategies into 
the model as ways to ameliorate world and regional problems. Thus, 
the model offers a gaming technique for policy makers to test their 
strategies toward problems. The concept of "organic growth" is pos-
ited as a replacement for uncontrolled and undifferentiated growth. 
This is likened to healthy biological growth which takes place only 
within the bounds of a total system and becomes a functionally 
differentiated part of that system. The contrasting undifferentiated 
growth is compared to cancerous biological growth which eventually 
kills the system itself. lo8 The tone of TURNING POINT is in stark con-
trast to LIMITS. This new study is billed as a "decision-aiding" tool 
to test alternative plans for "anticipatory action" on a national, 
regional, and global basis. It diffuses the growth controversy by 
calling for selective growth to balance regional groupings of nations. 
However, its underlying philosophical bent and feeling of urgency 
concerning world problems continues in the manner of previous 
Club of Rome efforts: 
Mankind cannot afford to wait for change to occur spontaneously and 
fortuitously. Rather, man must initiate on his own changes of necessary 
but tolerable magnitude in time to avert intolerably massive and exter-
nally generated change. A strategy for such change can be evolved only 
in the spirit of truly global cooperation, shaped in free partnership by 
the world's diverse regional communities and guided by a regional mas-
ter plan for long-term organic growth. All our computer simulations 
have shown quite clearly that this is the only sensible and feasible 
"" Id. 
'''' The Club of Rome: Act Two, TIME, October 21, 1974, at 108-09. 
III' M. MESAROVIC & E. PESTEL, MANKIND AT THE TURNING POINT (1974) [hereinafter cited 
as TURNING POINT). 
"" Id. at 32-55. 
"" Id. at 1-9. 
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approach to avoid major regional and ultimately global catastrophe, and 
that the time that can be wasted before developing such a global world 
system is running out. Clearly the only alternatives are division and 
conflict, hate, and destructionlO9 [emphasis in original]. 
TURNING POINT has been largely ignored, much as WORLD 
DYNAMICS had been previously yo The authors and the Club inten-
tionally avoided generating a controversy of the kind surrounding 
LIMITS. Also the tone of the report was designed to be optimistic. 
Decision-makers not only had the power to influence the course of 
future events, but this computer model was designed to give them 
insight into the likely consequences of policy options. Regional dis-
aggregation meant that growth, while still limited globally, could 
occur in some regions if counterbalanced by no-growth in other re-
gions. This approach appealed to the regions apparently destined by 
LIMITS' studies to perpetual poverty.1lI Of course, the consequences 
on those regions required to limit their growth are equally disturb-
ing, but somehow seem more distant since such adjustments do not 
condemn millions to death or continued malnutrition. 
Regional disaggregation in global models was undoubtedly essen-
tial. Policy options which could be implemented failed to emerge 
from the LIMITS models because of the gross aggregation involved in 
dealing with the world level of variables and relationships. The ten 
regions in TURNING POINT take on sufficiently homogeneous attrib-
utes to allow policies to be formulated and perhaps implemented. 112 
Moreover, the relations between regions highlighted by the model 
are useful in demonstrating how alternative growth paths will im-
pact various nations and regions. Such regionalization leads to a 
second contribution, the concept of organic growth. Growth will 
certainly continue to take place in some parts of the system. How 
such growth will be distributed and what will be the resulting conse-
quences becomes the important question. In theory the idea of man-
computer interaction as a gaming approach to policy formulation is 
'81 [d. at 157. 
"0 Representative samples of the reviews are Boulding, Conditional Optimism about the 
World Situation, 187 SCIENCE 1188-89 (March 1975); Douglas, Alternatives to Doomsday, 106 
SCIENCE NEWS 169 (October 1974); Model Makers Keep Trying To See the Future, BUSINESS 
WEEK, November 23, 1974, at 111-13. 
III Douglas, Alternatives to Doomsday, supra note 110. 
112 The regions are North America, Western Europe, Japan, the rest of the Developed 
Market Economies, Eastern Europe, Latin America, North Africa and the Middle East, Main 
Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and Centrally Planned Asia. For a list of countries included 
in these regions, see TURNING POINT, supra note 106, at 161-64. 
1976] LIMITS TO GROWTH REVISITED 95 
also desirable. Unless policy makers can benefit from computer 
models in some manner, they are unlikely to support quantitative 
approaches to world problems. 
Several of the problems which plagued LIMITS are equally present 
in TURNING POINT. The computer model used is machine-specific, 
making it extremely difficult for others to duplicate the model and 
replicate its finding at present. LIMITS was written in a simulation 
language which is readily accessible and transferable to other com-
puters. Unless the model behind TURNING POINT is handled likewise, 
very little dialog will be possible over this world model. The model-
ing effort in TURNING POINT is even more heroic -than that under-
taken in LIMITS due to the added complexity resulting from regional 
disaggregation of data and assumptions. As was the case in LIMITS, 
the charge can be leveled here that the richness of discipline-
oriented approaches to these problems could not possibly have been 
fully inculcated into the model. Of course, the structure of the re-
gional model can accept changes in data and relations as they be-
come available to the modelers, but doubts about the validity of the 
conclusions reached in TURNING POINT are possible as they were for 
LIMITS (such doubts are probably possible for any large-scale 
model). Finally, this "second generation" world model leaves the 
reader dissatisfied with the degree of guidance provided concerning 
how to implement the necessary policy options needed to achieve 
the scenarios desired by the modelers. Once again the ability to 
translate desired future conditions into present steps of action is 
absent. While it is understandable that such impetus for policy 
changes is difficult if not impossible to describe, models lacking 
such guidance may be frustrating and unfulfilling exercises. Sooner 
or later there must be a translation of such global knowledge into 
guidance for implementable action. The TURNING POINT model at-
tempts to demonstrate that only those scenarios leading to organic 
growth are sustainable and, therefore, that individual nations and 
regions should redefine their self-interest in light of such knowledge. 
Whether such advice will be heeded and what incentives will be 
necessary for policy makers to adopt such policies remain unan-
swered questions. 
CONCLUSIONS 
LIMITS has now been surpassed by other reports to the Club of 
Rome, and its errors and weaknesses have been exposed. Its lasting 
contribution lies more in the questions which it asked than in the 
answers which it provided, more in focusing public attention on 
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crucial issues of global futures than in specific descriptions of these 
possible futures. The issues raised by LIMITS transcend the crises of 
the moment but portend the future predicament of mankind. They 
are too important to be left solely to the "experts." 
Global modeling has become a battleground of ideologies as com-
peting groups strive to prove each other wrong or to surpass previous 
efforts. Their work will necessarily be technical, but the results 
must be debated by a broad spectrum of participants. Like the 
computers used to run them, global models have vast potential both 
to benefit and to harm mankind. The challenge is to channel this 
potential toward constructive ends and to provide a forum' wherein 
conflicts and controversy can be rationally settled and not allowed 
to destroy the modeling activities and their potential benefits. 
